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BUT SEE KOHLHEIM: THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
MUDDIES THE WATER ON THE 
COMPENSABILITY OF EMPLOYEE MEAL 
PERIODS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT IN BABCOCK v.  
BUTLER COUNTY 
Abstract: On November 24, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, in Babcock v. Butler County, formally adopted the application of the 
predominant benefit test when determining if the Fair Labor Standards Act re-
quires an hourly employee’s meal period to be compensated. In so doing, the 
court implicitly concluded that each circuit that previously addressed the issue 
adopted the predominant benefit test. This Comment argues that the Third 
Circuit mischaracterized the status of the law on which test the circuit courts 
apply by overlooking the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the relieved from 
all duties test. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) in 1938 in 
an effort to ensure and maintain the “general well-being” of workers in the 
United States.1 As part of this effort, the overtime-pay provision of the 
FLSA requires an employee working more than forty hours in a week to be 
paid at least one and one-half times his or her regular rate of pay for the 
time exceeding forty hours.2  
Disputes surrounding the administration and interpretation of the over-
time-pay provision followed closely on the heels of the FLSA’s enactment.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012) (noting that Con-
gress established the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) in an effort to remedy the poor labor 
conditions to which American workers were subjected and that Congress believed adversely af-
fected interstate commerce). See generally Michael A. Hacker, Comment, Permitted to Suffer for 
Experience: Second Circuit Uses “Primary Beneficiary” Test to Determine Whether Unpaid Interns 
Are Employees Under the FLSA in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 57 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 
67 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss6/5 [https://perma.cc/2KKG-6A7L] (de-
scribing the underlying purpose of the FLSA). 
 2 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
 3 See, e.g., Black Mountain Corp. v. Adkins, 133 S.W.2d 900, 900–01 (Ky. 1939) (addressing 
whether increased wages resulting from an employee’s disability pay nullified § 207(a)(1), the 
overtime-pay provision); Gurtov v. Volk, 11 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605–06 (Mun. Ct. 1939) (addressing 
whether or not an increase in an employee’s base pay was sufficient to satisfy the overtime pay 
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One such dispute concerned whether or not the time included in an employ-
ee’s meal period counts toward the forty-hour workweek.4 The FLSA itself 
makes no mention of whether or not an employee’s meal period is compen-
sable under the act.5  
In 1961, in an effort to clarify and more efficiently administer certain 
provisions of the FLSA, including the overtime-pay provision, the U.S. De-
partment of Labor (“DOL”) promulgated a number of interpretive regula-
tions.6 Included among these regulations is 29 C.F.R. § 785.19, which pro-
vides that the time accrued during an employee’s meal period is not com-
pensable under the FLSA if the meal period constitutes a “bona fide” meal 
period as the term is defined in the regulation.7 Courts regularly construe 
§ 785.19 as merely instructive, however, and consistently look beyond the 
plain meaning of its definition of a bona fide meal period in favor of their 
own interpretations.8  
The method by which courts determine whether or not a meal period is 
bona fide under § 785.19 turns on a court’s application of one of two tests: (1) 
                                                                                                                 
provision of the FLSA). Many disputes came in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s early inter-
pretations of FLSA provisions. See Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516 
(2014) (noting that the Court’s early cases interpreting the FLSA “provoked a flood of litigation”). 
 4 See, e.g., Culkin v. Glenn L. Martin Neb. Co., 97 F. Supp. 661, 672 (D. Neb. 1951) (ad-
dressing whether guards and firemen were relieved from their work responsibilities during their 
meal periods), aff’d, 197 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1952); Thompson v. F.W. Stock & Sons, 93 F. Supp. 
213, 214–15 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (addressing whether lunch periods were compensable under the 
FLSA), aff’d, 194 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1952); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 
123, 40 F. Supp. 4, 11 (N.D. Ala. 1941) (finding that the meal periods of miners eating inside of 
the mine did not count as worktime under the overtime-pay provision of the FLSA), aff’d, 135 
F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1943), aff’d, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). 
 5 Babcock v. Butler Cty. (Babcock II), 806 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 6 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.1–.50 (2016). These regulations were promulgated in 1961 with the main 
purpose of attempting to establish “what constitutes working time” so that the overtime pay provi-
sion could be properly administered. Id. § 785.1; see Leslie E. Barron, Note, “A Fair Day’s Pay 
for A Fair Day’s Work”: Why Congress Should Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act to Include 
an Actual Time Test for Retroactive Damages, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1328 n.171 (2014) (noting 
that these regulations “discuss the issues involved in determining what activities constitute work 
time”). The regulations provide guidance on when particular activities will be considered work-
time under the FLSA. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (meal periods); id. §§ 785.33–.41 (time spent 
travelling); id. §§ 785.20–.23 (time spent sleeping). 
 7 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). The regulation defines a “bona fide” meal period as a meal period 
typically lasting for at least thirty minutes and one where the employee is “completely relieved 
from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals.” Id. The regulation further advises that breaks 
or rest periods, such as “coffee breaks,” do not constitute bona fide meal periods. Id. 
 8 See Reich v. S. New England Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
because § 785.19 is an interpretative regulation, it should be construed flexibly and therefore 
courts are not required to adhere to its guidance on when a meal period should be compensable 
under the FLSA); 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (acknowledging that interpretations of the Department of 
Labor’s (“DOL’s”) regulations are ultimately left to the courts); see also Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 
156–57 (noting that courts routinely rely on their own interpretations of § 785.19 rather than the 
literal meaning of the regulation’s definition). 
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the relieved from all duties test or (2) the predominant benefit test.9 Both tests 
evaluate the nature of the work responsibilities that an employee owes to the 
employer during his or her meal period.10 The overwhelming majority of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals have adopted the predominant benefit test.11 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remains the only jurisdiction to de-
finitively apply the relieved from all duties test in any context.12 In November 
2015, in Babcock v. Butler County (“Babcock II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit became the most recent jurisdiction to formally adopt the 
predominant benefit test.13 In doing so, the court joined the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth circuits.14  
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit, in Babcock II, mischarac-
terized the status of the law on the compensability of meal periods under the 
FLSA when it concluded that the Eleventh Circuit does not apply the re-
lieved from all duties test.15 Part I of this Comment examines the standards 
and underlying reasoning of the two tests and discusses the factual and pro-
cedural history of Babcock II.16 Part II discusses the Third Circuit’s treat-
ment of relevant Eleventh Circuit precedent and examines the reasoning 
behind the court’s interpretations of two pertinent Eleventh Circuit hold-
ings.17 Finally, Part III argues that the court misinterpreted this precedent 
                                                                                                                 
 9 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155; see Michael Carlin, Bringing Home the Bacon: Mealtime Don-
ning and Doffing Under the FLSA in the Meat Processing Industry, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
191, 203–04 (2014) (describing the two tests). 
 10 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155 (describing what the tests “look[]” at when they are ap-
plied). 
 11 See id. at 156 (listing circuits that have adopted the test); see also Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of 
Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264 n.16 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting the predominant benefit test); Roy v. Cty. 
of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Reich, 121 F.3d at 64 (same); Henson v. 
Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Alexander v. City of Chicago, 
994 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1157 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (same); Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1984) (same). 
 12 Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that an employee’s 
meal period is compensable under § 785.19 when an employee is relieved of their work duties 
during the meal period); see also Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1307 n.4 
(N.D. Ala. 2008) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit applies the relieved from all duties standard 
when interpreting § 785.19). The First, Ninth, and D.C. circuits have yet to formally adopt either 
test. See O’Hara v. Menino, 253 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (D. Mass. 2003) (applying the predominant 
benefit test and acknowledging that the First Circuit had yet to officially adopt either test); Daniel 
Wiessner, 3rd Circuit Adopts “Predominant Benefit” Test for Meal Break Lawsuits, 30 No. 11 
WESTLAW J. EMP. 4, Dec. 22, 2015, at *1 (noting that the First Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and D.C. 
Circuit have not adopted either test). 
 13 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156. 
 14 Id.; see supra note 11 and accompanying text (listing circuits that have adopted the pre-
dominant benefit test). 
 15 See infra notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 56–69 and accompanying text. 
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and that there remains a circuit split on which test to apply when determin-
ing whether or not a meal period is bona fide under § 785.19.18  
I. WEIGHING THE OPTIONS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT HAS ITS SAY ON THE 
COMPENSABILITY OF MEAL PERIODS UNDER THE FLSA 
Prior to the Babcock II ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit had yet to address the compensability of employee meal periods un-
der the FLSA.19 The decision in Babcock II turned on whether or not the 
meal periods of the appellants were bona fide under § 785.19.20 If they were 
bona fide, the meal periods would not count as worktime and thus would 
not implicate the FLSA’s overtime-pay provision.21 To make this determina-
tion, the Third Circuit formally adopted and applied the predominant benefit 
test.22 Section A of this Part examines the standards and underlying reason-
ing of the two tests.23 Section B discusses the factual and procedural history 
of Babcock II, wherein the Third Circuit formally adopted the predominant 
benefit test.24 
A. The Tests 
Under the relieved from all duties test, a meal period is bona fide if the 
employee is completely relieved of all of his or her duties during the meal 
period.25 The application of the relieved from all duties test derives from 
                                                                                                                 
 18 See infra notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
 19 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155. 
 20 See id. at 156–57 (discussing § 785.19(a) and applying the predominant benefit test); 29 
C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (“Bona fide meal periods are not worktime.”).  
 21 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156–57 (analyzing whether the nature of the corrections offic-
ers’ duties during their meal periods required them to be compensated). Under the corrections 
officers’ collectively bargained compensation scheme, no employee would exceed forty hours of 
compensated worktime per week. See id. at 155 (describing the parties’ collectively bargained 
compensation scheme). Were the entirety of their meal periods deemed compensable, however, 
they would have been entitled to overtime pay. See id. (explaining that only forty-five minutes of 
each one-hour meal period was compensated). 
 22 See id. at 156 (adopting and applying the predominant benefit test). 
 23 See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 25 See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (requiring that an employee be “completely relieved from duty” 
during a bona fide meal period); see also Summers v. Howard Univ., 127 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 
(D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that the relieved from all duties test follows the literal language of 
§ 785.19); Abendschein v. Montgomery Cty., 984 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Md. 1997) (concluding 
that the relieved from all duties test relies on the literal language of § 785.19). Section 785.19 
provides several illustrations of when an employee is, in fact, relieved from all duties and thus 
when his or her meal period is bona fide. § 785.19(a). For example, the regulation advises that an 
office employee who is required to eat at his or her desk while performing work related tasks 
would not be considered to be completely relieved of all of his or her duties and thus his or her 
meal period would not be bona fide under the regulation. Id. The DOL still instructs that an em-
2017] Third Circuit Adopts Predominant Benefit Test But Muddies Meal Period Split  95 
both Tenth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which encourages 
lower courts to grant a measure of deference to the guidance set forth by the 
DOL regulations.26 According to this precedent, such regulations constitute 
strong persuasive authority that should be followed absent a legitimate rea-
son to cast them aside.27 The application of the relieved from all duties test 
therefore stays true to that sentiment by directly tracking the plain meaning 
of § 785.19’s language.28 
Conversely, the predominant benefit test looks outside the plain mean-
ing of the regulation’s language and evaluates which party receives the pre-
dominant benefit of the meal period: the employer or the employee.29 If the 
employee receives the predominant benefit, the meal period is bona fide and 
the time will not count as worktime.30 The predominant benefit test is de-
rived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of the term “work,” as 
used in the FLSA, in its 1944 opinion in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad 
Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123.31 In Tennessee Coal, the Court construed the 
                                                                                                                 
ployee’s meal period must be compensated unless the employee is completely relieved of all of his 
or her duties during the meal period. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT 
SHEET #22: HOURS WORKED UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2008), https://www.dol.
gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs22.htm [https://perma.cc/RF5W-TMC9] (noting the standard for a 
compensable meal period). 
 26 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 157 n.7 (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) 
(noting that DOL regulations are a source of “guidance” for parties); Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 
n.20 (citing Mitchell v. Greinetz, 235 F. 2d 621, 625 (10th Cr. 1956)) (noting that courts should 
not be too quick to dismiss the guidance of the DOL’s regulations). 
 27 See Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 n.20 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 and Mitchell, 235 F. 
2d at 625). 
 28 See Summers, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (concluding that the relieved from all duties test fol-
lows the literal language of § 785.19); 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (“The employee must be completely 
relieved from duty . . . .”). 
 29 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156–57; Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the employer may receive the predominant benefit of the meal period if the 
employee’s meal period is limited by the imposition of work duties); Alexander, 994 F.2d at 339 
(noting that an employer typically receives the predominant benefit of a meal period when the 
imposition of work responsibilities or duties disrupts the employee’s meal period such that the 
employee is “unable to pass the mealtime comfortably”). 
 30 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 158 (holding that employee meal periods were not compensa-
ble under the FLSA because the employees did not receive the predominant benefit of their meal 
periods); see also Lawrence E. Henke, Comment, Is the Fair Labor Standards Act Really Fair? 
Government Abuse or Financial Necessity: An Analysis of the Fair Labor Standards Act 1974 
Amendment—the § 207(k) Exemption, 52 SMU L. REV. 1847, 1865 (1999) (describing the pre-
dominant benefit test). The rationale that courts have typically proffered in support of interpreting 
§ 785.19 to require an application of the predominant benefit test is most soundly set forth in the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Reich v. Southern New England Telecommunications Corp. See 121 
F.3d at 64–65 (describing Supreme Court precedent as the basis for the creation of the predomi-
nant benefit test); see also Henson, 6 F.3d at 534 (describing the reasoning behind the application 
of the predominant benefit test). 
 31 See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) 
(defining work as “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required 
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FLSA’s use of the term “work” to encompass activities required by an em-
ployer that are carried out predominantly for the benefit of the employer.32 
Thus, lower courts have reasoned that if the time spent during a meal period 
does not predominantly benefit the employer, it cannot properly be consid-
ered “work” as that term is understood under the FLSA and is not be com-
pensable.33  
The predominant benefit test can accurately be said to be more em-
ployer-friendly because it allows the employer to impose uncompensated 
work responsibilities on an employee during his or her meal period as long 
as the employee ultimately enjoys the predominant benefit of the meal peri-
od.34 Conversely, the relieved from all duties test grants more rights to em-
                                                                                                                 
by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his 
business”); see also Reich, 121 F.3d at 64, 65 (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases as the basis for the 
development of the predominant benefit test).  
 32 See Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 516 (acknowledging that the decision in Tennessee 
Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123 was issued in response to the fact that Con-
gress did not define the term “work” in the FLSA); Reich, 121 F.3d at 64 (describing the Tennes-
see Coal decision); see also Victor M. Velarde, Comment, On the Construction of Section 203(o) 
of the FLSA: Exclusion Without Exemption, 21 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 253, 256 (2013) (describ-
ing the Tennessee Coal holding). Subsequent to the Tennessee Coal decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that determinations of work are necessarily fact-bound inquiries. See Reich, 121 F.3d at 
64 (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 32 U.S. 126, 133 (1944)). Recognizing the disputes sur-
rounding what exactly constitutes work, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947 to cate-
gorically preclude employees from claiming that time spent “walking, riding, or travelling” to 
their place of work or activities “preliminary to or postliminary to” their “principal . . . activities” 
constitutes work. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012); see Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 516 (describing 
the history of the Portal-to-Portal Act). 
 33 See Reich, 121 F.3d at 64 (“The central issue in mealtime cases is whether the employees 
are required to ‘work’ as that term is understood under the FLSA.”). The argument in favor of the 
predominant benefit test over the relieved from all duties test when interpreting § 785.19 is further 
supported by the existence of opinion letters issued by DOL representatives in the 1980s that sug-
gest the Secretary of Labor’s desire for the courts to apply a “broad” and “flexible” interpretation 
of § 785.19. See id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Aug. 25, 
1980)) (discussing opinion letters that advised a literal reading of § 785.19 would require certain 
types of employees to be compensated “24 hours [a] day”). 
 34 See Henson, 6 F.3d at 534 (describing the relieved from all duties test as “unrealistic” because 
it would require compensation even if the employee merely “remain[ed] on-call”). The practical 
implications of one test over the other on employers and employees alike was evident following the 
issuance of the 2015 Babcock II opinion, as law firms and employment blogs across the country 
raced to provide analysis on what the ruling meant for employers and employees. See, e.g., Nicole L. 
Leitner, Third Circuit Adopts New Test for Determining Whether Meal Breaks Are Compensable, 
LABOR & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.labor-law-blog.com/wage-and-hour-flsa/third-
circuit-adopts-new-test-for-determining-whether-meal-breaks-are-compensable [https://perma.cc/
344A-322G] (suggesting the employers should remain vigilant on whether the meal periods offered 
to their employees are in line with the Babcock II ruling); Adam R. Long, When Must Meal Breaks 
Be Paid? Third Circuit Clarifies FLSA Test, PA. LABOR & EMP. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.
palaborandemploymentblog.com/2015/12/articles/wage-hour/mealbreaks/ [https://perma.cc/AUQ3-
D3JR] (advising that employers should take note of the Babcock II ruling because a failure to follow 
the meal break requirements under the FLSA could expose them to liability); David Treibman, Third 
Circuit: Meal Breaks for Employees’ “Predominant Benefit” Are Not Worktime, WAGE & HOUR LS. 
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ployees, as the imposition of work responsibilities during an employee’s meal 
period would require the entirety of the meal period to be compensated.35  
B. Babcock v. Butler County: The Third Circuit Adopts  
the Predominant Benefit Test 
On March 29, 2012, Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at Butler 
County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania, initiated a putative class action suit 
against her employer in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.36 The complaint alleged that Butler County Prison (“Butler 
County”) violated the FLSA by improperly failing to compensate the plain-
tiffs for the entirety of their meal periods.37  
Under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), the cor-
rections officers were required to work eight and one-quarter hours during 
each shift.38 These shifts included a one hour meal period.39 Butler County, 
however, only compensated forty-five minutes of the one hour meal peri-
                                                                                                                 
BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Wage-and-Hour-Laws/Meal-Breaks-
Predominant-Benefit-Not-Worktime [https://perma.cc/GWL5-4DZ4] (suggesting that the Babcock II 
ruling is welcome news for employers given the strict standard that the predominant benefit test ap-
plies to whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA); Casey Yamasaki, Meal Breaks 
Undergo FLSA Test, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP (Dec. 10, 2015), http://
www.sfmslaw.com/blog/2015/12/meal-breaks-undergo-flsa-test.shtml [https://perma.cc/BL3Q-3JLQ] 
(emphasizing the significance of the Babcock II decision because the law was now clear in the Third 
Circuit’s jurisdiction).  
 35 See Kevin McGowan, Unpaid Meal Time Not Covered by FLSA, 3rd Cir. Affirms, BLOOM-
BERG BNA: DAILY LABOR REP. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.bna.com/unpaid-meal-time-n579
82063954/ [https://perma.cc/DCU3-AV6C] (suggesting the relieved from all duties test is more 
“employee-friendly”). In adopting the predominant benefit test, the Eighth Circuit in Henson v. 
Pulaski County Sheriff Department specifically rejected the relieved from all duties test over con-
cerns that its application would hamstring employers. See Henson, 6 F.3d at 534 (holding that it is 
“unrealistic” for employers to be responsible). The court expressed reservations over the broad 
scope of plaintiffs that an adoption of the relieved from all duties test would seem to allow for. See 
id. In the court’s view, the test was “unrealistic,” as it would force employers to compensate the 
meal period of any employee who had even a minimal level of responsibility during his or her 
meal period. See id. 
 36 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155; see Babcock v. Butler Cty. (Babcock I), No. 12CV394, 2014 
WL 688122, *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2014). The lawsuit took a number of years to reach court, as 
the corrections officers’ complaint was originally dismissed in 2012 because of a jurisdictional 
issue emanating from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. Babcock I, 2014 WL 688122, 
at *2. The court stayed the case while the parties worked through arbitration but eventually reo-
pened it in January 2014 after the corrections officers filed an unopposed motion to reopen the 
case. Id. 
 37 Babcock I, 2014 WL 688122, at *1, 3; Complaint at 6–7, ¶¶ 41–48, Babcock I, 2014 WL 
688122 (No. 12CV394) (alleging that Butler County Prison (“Butler County”) violated the FLSA 
by failing to pay plaintiffs overtime compensation). 
 38 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155. 
 39 Id. 
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od.40 The corrections officers challenged the legality of the uncompensated 
fifteen minutes under the overtime-pay provision of the FLSA and contend-
ed that the full hour should have been compensated.41 In support of their 
claim, the corrections officers alleged that, during their meal periods, they 
were not allowed to leave the prison without permission and were required 
to remain on-call, in-uniform, and in close proximity to emergency response 
equipment.42 The corrections officers argued that these facts proved that 
their meal periods were not bona fide under § 785.19 and that Butler Coun-
ty was in violation of the FLSA for not compensating the entirety of the 
meal periods.43 
Butler County moved to dismiss the suit in February 2014, arguing that, 
under the predominant benefit test, the corrections officers received the pre-
dominant benefit of the meal periods and therefore Butler County was not 
required to compensate them for the full hour.44 The district court agreed and 
dismissed the suit.45 The corrections officers appealed the dismissal to the 
Third Circuit.46  
Prior to its decision in Babcock II, the Third Circuit had yet to adopt ei-
ther the relieved from all duties test or the predominant benefit test when 
making a determination on whether a meal period was bona fide under 
§ 785.19.47 Confident that the allegations within their complaint were suffi-
cient to satisfy either test and thus survive Butler County’s motion to dismiss, 
the corrections officers did not implore the court to apply one test over the 
other.48 Following the trend among its sister circuits, the Third Circuit adopt-
                                                                                                                 
 40 Id. By compensating only forty-five minutes of the one-hour meal period, it was not possi-
ble for the corrections officers to work in excess of eight hours per shift. See id. (describing the 
compensation scheme). Thus, Butler County was not required to pay any overtime to the correc-
tions officers because the corrections officers could typically only accrue a maximum forty hours 
of worktime per week. See id. (describing the compensation scheme). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.; see Complaint at 5, ¶¶ 27–34, Babcock I, 2014 WL 688122 (No. 12CV394) (reciting 
the factual allegations that the corrections officers contended established that Butler County was 
required to pay overtime compensation under the FLSA). 
 43 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155 (describing the corrections officers’ argument); Appellants’ 
Brief at 15–16, Babcock II, 806 F.3d 153 (No. 14-1467), 2014 WL 3696690, at *15–16 [hereinaf-
ter Babcock II Appellants’ Brief] (reciting the facts and alleging that the facts were sufficient to 
prove that the meal period should have been fully compensated). 
 44 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156. 
 45 Babcock I, 2014 WL 688122, at *10. 
 46 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155. 
 47 Babcock I, 2014 WL 688122, at *4 (noting that the Third Circuit had not previously ad-
dressed whether to apply the predominant benefit test or the relieved from all duties test when 
interpreting § 785.19); see also Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155 (acknowledging that the issue before 
the court was one of first impression). 
 48 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (noting that neither party disputed the application of the 
predominant benefit test over the relieved from all duties test); Babcock II Appellants’ Brief, supra 
note 43, at *16–18 (arguing that the corrections officers’ complaint should survive Butler County’s 
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ed the predominant benefit test.49 After applying the test, the Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the corrections officers re-
tained the predominant benefit of their meal periods and thus the full hour of 
their meal periods were not required to be compensated under the FLSA.50 
II. UNANIMITY AMONG THE CIRCUITS?: THE THIRD CIRCUIT CONCLUDES 
THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPLIES THE PREDOMINANT BENEFIT TEST 
In dismissing the corrections officers’ claims in 2015 in Babcock v. 
Butler County (“Babcock II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit formally adopted the predominant benefit test.51 Prior to doing so, the 
court summarized the status of the law across the circuits and concluded 
that there was not a circuit split on the appropriate test for determining 
whether a meal period is bona fide under § 785.19.52 Included in this sum-
mary was reference to and discussion of Eleventh Circuit precedent on the 
issue.53 Section A of this Part examines the Third Circuit’s discussion and 
interpretation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 1990 
holding in Kohlheim v. Glynn County.54 Section B of this Part examines the 
Third Circuit’s citation to the Eleventh Circuit’s 1994 opinion in Avery v. 
City of Talladega.55 
                                                                                                                 
motion to dismiss because the corrections officers were entitled to have their meal periods com-
pensated under the FLSA irrespective of whether the court applied the predominant benefit test or 
the relieved from all duties test). 
 49 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156. The majority ruled over one dissenting judge who concluded 
that the corrections officers had met the requisite pleading standard required to survive a motion to 
dismiss. See id. at 162 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (arguing that the corrections officers had “set 
forth sufficient allegations to state a claim”). The dissent did not, however, dispute the majority’s 
decision to adopt and apply the predominant benefit test. Id. at 158–62.  
 50 Id. at 157–58 (majority opinion). Although it acknowledged that some limitations were 
placed on the corrections officers during their meal periods, the court concluded that the limita-
tions were not so restrictive that Butler County received the predominant benefit of the meal peri-
ods. Id. at 157. The court also observed that the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), alt-
hough silent on the compensability of the fifteen-minute period, included a provision that compen-
sated the corrections officers for any meal period that was in fact interrupted by their work duties. 
Id. In the court’s view, this provision buoyed the view that the corrections officers retained the 
predominant benefit of the meal period. Id. at 157–58. Although the petitioners disputed the 
court’s decision, their motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied. Babcock v. Butler 
Cty., No. 14-1467, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2016) (denying motion for rehearing and rehear-
ing en banc). 
 51 Babcock v. Butler Cty. (Babcock II), 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
Third Circuit joins the majority of other circuits in adopting the predominant benefit test). 
 52 See id. at 155, 156 (acknowledging the two tests and noting the positions of other U.S. 
Courts of Appeals with respect to their application of the predominant benefit test or the relieved 
from all duties test). 
 53 Id. at 156. 
 54 See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
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A. Did They or Didn’t They?: Kohlheim and the Application  
of the Predominant Benefit Test 
On appeal, the Third Circuit in Babcock II rejected the corrections of-
ficers’ contention that the circuits were split on the appropriate test to apply 
when determining whether a meal period is bona fide under § 785.19.56 In 
the Third Circuit’s view, the Eleventh Circuit—the only circuit to arguably 
apply a separate test—did not apply the relieved from all duties test.57 The 
Third Circuit rested this conclusion in part on its own interpretation of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s 1990 decision in Kohlheim.58 Kohlheim involved a claim 
brought by local firefighters against their town employer for the employer’s 
failure to compensate the firefighters’ meal periods under the overtime-pay 
provision of the FLSA.59 The Eleventh Circuit held in favor of the firefight-
ers and ruled that their meal periods should have been compensated.60 The 
Third Circuit in Babcock II examined the Kohlheim decision and concluded 
that the Eleventh Circuit did not apply the relieved from all duties test in 
that case, as the corrections officers had asserted.61 Rather, the Third Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 56 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156; see Babcock II Appellants’ Brief, supra note 43, at *17 
(“There is current [sic] a circuit split regarding the appropriate test relating to the compensation of 
meal periods.”). The Third Circuit in Babcock II addressed two cases from the Eleventh Circuit 
and Ninth Circuit that the corrections officers cited to for the proposition that the circuits were 
split on whether to apply the predominant benefit test or relieved from all duties test. Babcock II, 
806 F.3d at 156 (citing Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 531 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014), and Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty., 915 F.2d 
1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990)). After analyzing the two cases, however, the Third Circuit concluded 
that the cited Ninth Circuit case did not definitively adopt either test and that the cited Eleventh 
Circuit case did not apply the relieved from all duties test, but rather “applied its version of the 
predominant benefit test.” Id. 
 57 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (examining case law that the corrections officers argued to 
have applied or adopted the relieved from all duties test and rejecting the corrections officers’ 
contention). 
 58 See id. (concluding that the court in Kohlheim v. Glynn County did not apply the relieved 
from all duties test).  
 59 See Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1474. The firefighters in Kohlheim would regularly work several 
shifts per week of approximately twenty-four hours per shift. Id. at 1474–75. Because each shift 
spanned the entire day, the town did not compensate the plaintiffs for three hours of each shift, 
thereby effectively building in three one-hour meal periods per shift. Id. at 1475. The plaintiffs 
brought a claim under the FLSA, arguing that the three one-hour meal periods per shift should 
have been compensated because they were effectively still working during these meal periods. Id. 
 60 See id. at 1477 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ meal periods were “compensable under 
FLSA regulations for overtime purposes”). 
 61 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (citing Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477) (concluding that the 
Eleventh Circuit did not apply the relived from all duties test in Kohlheim). At the time of the 
Babcock II decision, the only circuit that could have been said to apply the relieved from all duties 
test was the Eleventh Circuit. See Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1307 n.4 
(N.D. Ala. 2008) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit applies the “completely relieved from duty” 
standard when interpreting § 785.19 and acknowledging that the Eleventh Circuit was an outlier 
among the circuits by doing do). By concluding that the Eleventh Circuit did not apply the re-
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concluded that the actual test applied in Kohlheim was a derivation of the 
predominant benefit test.62 To support its conclusion, the Third Circuit cited 
a portion of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Kohlheim that noted that the 
restrictions placed upon the firefighters during their meal periods “inure[d] 
to the benefit of the county.”63  
B. Avery and the Predominant Benefit Test 
In further support of its conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit had 
adopted the predominant benefit test, the Third Circuit in Babcock II cited 
the Eleventh Circuit’s 1994 decision in Avery.64 In Avery, members of the 
city’s police department alleged that the department had violated the FLSA 
by failing to properly compensate its employees during their meal periods.65 
Notably, however, Avery did not involve an interpretation of § 785.19, but 
instead dealt exclusively with whether or not the employer could claim an 
exemption under section 7(k) of the FLSA (“section K”) to avoid compen-
sating the employees’ meal periods.66 Under section K, public agencies may 
                                                                                                                 
lieved from all duties test, the Third Circuit in Babcock II implicitly swept away any suggestion of 
a circuit split on the issue. See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (concluding that in Kohlheim the Elev-
enth Circuit did not apply the relieved from all duties test). But see Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff 
Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that Kohlheim turned on the fact that the plaintiffs 
had not been “completely relieved from duty”). 
 62 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156. The Third Circuit is not alone in its interpretation, as several 
courts and commentators have wrestled over whether the Eleventh Circuit does in fact apply the 
relieved from all duties test. Compare Havrilla v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 454, 464 (2016) 
(citing Kohlheim as precedent for the application of the predominant benefit test), and Wiessner, 
supra note 12, at *1 (concluding that the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted the relieved from all 
duties test), with Henson, 6 F.3d at 534–35 (recognizing the circuit split and noting that Kohlheim 
turned on the fact that the plaintiffs had not been “completely relieved from duty”), and Chao, 568 
F. Supp. 2d at 1307 n.4 (interpreting the Kohlheim decision as having applied the relieved from all 
duties test), and McGowan, supra note 35 (concluding that the Eleventh Circuit applied the “re-
lieved from duty” standard). 
 63 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (quoting Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477) (“The firefighters 
are subject to real limitations on their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of the 
county; accordingly, the [meal periods] are compensable under FLSA regulations for overtime 
purposes.”). But see Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 (“[T]he essential consideration in determining 
whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period . . . is whether the employees are in fact relieved 
from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”); infra notes 73–80 and accom-
panying text (arguing that the Third Circuit misinterpreted the Kohlheim decision). 
 64 See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156 (citing Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th 
Cir. 1994)) (“The majority of the courts of appeals have adopted [the predominant benefit] test.”).  
 65 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 66 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 7(k), 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2012); Avery, 24 F.3d at 
1344–46 (concluding that § 785.19 is a “regulation of general application” but that § 7(k) of the 
FLSA (“section K”) law enforcement employees are subjected to a different standard). Although 
the corrections officers in Babcock II would seemingly have been subject to the section K exemp-
tion, the court noted that neither party asserted that the exemption applied. See Babcock II, 806 
F.3d at 155 n.1 (“There is a special provision in the FLSA that covers employees engaged in fire 
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claim an exemption and avoid paying overtime to law-enforcement and fire 
protection employees who typically work long shifts where they remain on-
call.67 In resolving the claim, the Eleventh Circuit applied the predominant 
benefit test in Avery and held that the meal periods of the employees who fit 
within the section K exemption were not required to be compensated under 
the FLSA.68 Relying on this holding, the Third Circuit in Babcock II includ-
ed Avery in a string citation purporting to provide an exhaustive list of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals that had definitively adopted the predominant benefit test 
for their jurisdictions.69 
III. MUDDYING THE WATER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT MISINTERPRETS THE 
STATUS OF THE LAW REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF  
THE PREDOMINANT BENEFIT TEST 
By concluding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
had adopted the predominant benefit test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in 2015, in Babcock v. Butler County (“Babcock II”), mischar-
acterized the status of the law regarding which test the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals apply when determining whether a meal period is bona fide under 
§ 785.19.70 Section A of this Part argues that the Third Circuit was incorrect 
                                                                                                                 
protection or law enforcement activities, 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), but none of the parties to this case 
has suggested it has any applicability here.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (noting that security at 
correctional institutions falls within the class of employees that may be exempted from the over-
time pay provision). Accordingly, the court did not address the section K exemption in the opin-
ion. See Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 155–58 (failing to address the section K exemption). 
 67 29 U.S.C. § 207(k); see Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 (summarizing the section K exemp-
tion). Thus, section K looks at the hours worked over a monthly period before calculating over-
time, rather than requiring overtime pay when an employee works more than forty hours in any 
one week as required by the overtime-pay provision. See 20 U.S.C. § 207(k) (authorizing overtime 
calculation across a twenty-eight day period if the total number of hours exceeds 216); see also 
Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments, 52 
Fed. Reg. 1897, 2024 (Jan. 16, 1987) (“Congress was aware of the extended duty hours and unu-
sual working conditions of public safety employees. To accommodate these conditions, [Con-
gress] adopted the limited overtime pay exemption in section 7(k).”).  
 68 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1346 (concluding that under the predominant benefit test, the plain-
tiffs’ meal periods were not required to be compensated). Section K has its own administering 
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 553.233, which contains language similar to § 785.19 but instead address-
es when a public agency must compensate the meal periods of section K employees. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 553.233 (2016). Although similar to § 785.19, the DOL itself and courts have noted that the 
differences between the regulations indicate that the regulations are intended to be analyzed dif-
ferently. See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit applies a 
different standard for determining the compensability of meal periods for an employee under 
§ 785.19 than for a section K exempt employees). But see Henke, supra note 30, at 864–68 (com-
piling cases where courts have applied § 785.19 to section K exempt employees). 
 69 Babcock II, 806 F.3d at 156. 
 70 See Reich v. S. New England Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1997) (rec-
ognizing the circuit split); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534–35 (8th Cir. 
1993) (same); Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying the re-
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when it concluded that the Eleventh Circuit, in 1990, in Kohlheim v. Glynn 
County, did not apply the relieved from all duties test.71 Section B argues 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the predominant benefit test in 1994, 
in Avery v. City of Talladega, was narrowly tailored and was not intended as 
a blanket adoption of the test for the Eleventh Circuit.72 
A. But See Kohlheim: The Eleventh Circuit Did Not Adopt  
the Predominant Benefit Test in Kohlheim 
The Third Circuit misinterpreted Kohlheim when it concluded that the 
Eleventh Circuit had applied a variation of the predominant benefit test.73 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit in Babcock II cited language from 
the Kohlheim opinion that seemingly identified the “benefit” that “inure[d]” 
to the employer during the meal period as a consideration in determining 
whether a meal period is compensable.74 It appears that the court overlooked, 
however, the Kohlheim opinion’s preceding paragraph that identified the “the 
essential consideration” in determining whether or not a meal period is bona 
fide under § 785.19 to be “whether the employees are in fact relieved from 
work for the purpose of eating.”75 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s appar-
ent consideration of the “benefit” that “inure[d]” to the employer during the 
meal period should not have been construed by the Third Circuit in Babcock 
II as an application of the predominant benefit test.76 Moreover, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s repeated deference to the explicit language of § 785.19’s definition 
                                                                                                                 
lieved from all duties test); see also Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 531 n.4 
(9th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014) (citing Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477) 
(noting that Kohlheim applied the “‘completely relieved from duty’ standard”). 
 71 See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 (applying the relieved from all duties test). Numerous 
courts have recognized that the Eleventh Circuit in Kohlheim applied the relieved from all duties 
test. See, e.g., Reich, 121 F.3d at 64–65 (recognizing that the court in Kohlheim applies a different 
test than the predominant benefit test); Henson, 6 F.3d at 534–35 (noting that the court in Kohl-
heim required compensation for firefighters who were not “completely relieved from duty” during 
their meal periods); O’Hara v. Menino, 253 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155–56 (D. Mass. 2003) (concluding 
that the court in Kohlheim applied the relieved from all duties test); Summers v. Howard Univ., 
127 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (same). 
 74 See Babcock v. Butler Cty. (Babcock II), 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Kohl-
heim, 915 F.2d at 1477) (“The firefighters are subject to real limitations on their freedom during 
mealtime which inure to the benefit of the county; accordingly, the [meal periods] are compensa-
ble under FLSA regulations for overtime purposes.”). 
 75 Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477; see also A.B.A., Federal Labor Standards: Report of the 
Committee on Federal Labor Standards Legislation, 7 LAB. LAW. 701, 726 (1991) (concluding 
that the Eleventh Circuit in Kohlheim held that the firefighters were not completely relieved of 
their duties and thus their meal periods were compensable under the FLSA). 
 76 See Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477 (describing the “essential consideration” of § 785.19 de-
terminations as whether or not the employee is “relieved from work”). 
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of a bona fide meal period reflects the court’s view that the regulation should 
be interpreted literally.77 The test that most naturally follows from a plain 
reading of the regulation is the relieved from all duties test.78 Furthermore, 
several of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts have recog-
nized that the Eleventh Circuit applied the relieved from all duties test in 
Kohlheim.79 Thus, as long as Kohlheim remains good law, the circuits remain 
split on which test to apply when determining whether a meal period is bona 
fide under § 785.19.80 
B. An Overbroad Reading of a Narrow Holding: The Third Circuit Expands 
the Scope of Avery’s Adoption of the Predominant Benefit Test 
The Third Circuit improperly expanded the scope of Avery’s holding 
when it cited Avery as further support for the conclusion that the Eleventh 
Circuit had adopted the predominant benefit test.81 Although the Eleventh 
Circuit did indeed apply the predominant benefit test in Avery—rather than 
involving an interpretation of § 785.19, as Kohlheim had—the case in the 
Avery dealt solely with section K of the overtime-pay provision and its ad-
ministering regulations.82 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly distin-
guished Avery from Kohlheim.83  
                                                                                                                 
 77 See id. at 1477 & n.20 (hailing § 785.19 as “an appropriate statement of the law” and not-
ing that the regulation “offer[s] a useful and fair standard by which to determine whether a meal 
period should be considered worktime under the FLSA”). 
 78 See id. at 1477; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining that the relieved 
from all duties test follows the plain meaning of the language in § 785.19). 
 79 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (compiling cases recognizing the circuit split on 
the application of the predominant benefit test); see also, e.g., Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 
F.3d 259, 264 n.16 (5th Cir. 1998) (failing to cite Kohlheim in a footnote purporting to provide an 
exhaustive list of U.S. Courts of Appeals that had adopted the predominant benefit test); Abend-
schein v. Montgomery Cty., 984 F. Supp. 356, 366 (D. Md. 1997) (concluding that the Eleventh 
Circuit in Kohlheim applied the relieved from all duties test).  
 80 See Reich, 121 F.3d at 64–65 (acknowledging the circuit split implicitly); Henson, 6 F.3d at 
534–35 (same); Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1307 n.4 (N.D. Ala. 2008) 
(concluding that the Eleventh Circuit remains the only circuit to apply the “completely relieved 
from duty standard”); see also McGowan, supra note 35 (concluding that the Babcock II decision 
“deepens” the circuit split on the application of the predominant benefit test or the relieved from 
all duties test when determining the compensability of meal period under the FLSA). 
 81 See Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
case before it was one of first impression regarding the compensability of meal periods for section 
K law-enforcement employees and that the court’s decision stands alone and apart from its previ-
ous decision in Kohlheim). 
 82 See id. at 1346 (concluding that the predominant benefit test is “the appropriate standard for 
determining whether a section 7(k) law enforcement employee’s meal break is compensable time 
under the FLSA”). 
 83 See id. (“[A] higher level of duty is required before meal breaks are compensable for [sec-
tion K] law enforcement employees . . . . The fact that [§ 785.19] contains some broad language 
. . . not found in the regulation applicable to law enforcement employees also supports our conclu-
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Section K exempts public agencies from the requirements of the over-
time-pay provision with respect to compensating law enforcement and fire 
protection employees.84 Rather than requiring public agencies to provide 
overtime compensation when an employee works more than forty hours in a 
week, as the overtime-pay provision requires, section K only requires over-
time compensation for exempted employees once they exceed a threshold 
number of work hours over a twenty-eight day period.85 Thus, under section 
K, a law enforcement employee could conceivably work eighty hours in a 
five day workweek without receiving overtime pay if the total number of 
his or her work hours over the twenty-eight day period fell below two hun-
dred and sixteen, the threshold number outlined in the statute.86 
Because the facts of Avery and Kohlheim were readily distinguishable, 
the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the predominant benefit test in Avery was 
limited and the court strongly implied that the test would only apply in cas-
es in which an employer asserts the section K exemption.87 Avery did not 
implement a blanket adoption of the predominant benefit test for the Elev-
enth Circuit or otherwise overrule Kohlheim in any respect.88 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                 
sion. Because Kohlheim did not involve law enforcement officers, that case turned solely on the 
Court’s interpretation of section 785.19(a).”). 
 84 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 7(k), 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2012); see Henke, supra note 
30 (describing the section K exemption). 
 85 See § 207(k) (stating that overtime hours for section K law enforcement employees arise 
only if the employee exceeds a threshold number of hours over a twenty-eight day period); see 
also Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1476–77 (describing the section K exemption but concluding that it 
was inapplicable to the question before the court). Currently, employees exempted under section 
K will receive overtime pay if they exceed 216 work hours in a consecutive twenty-eight day 
period, or if they meet one of the other enumerated requirements under section K. § 207(k). 
 86 See § 207(k) (describing when overtime hours arise for law enforcement employees ex-
empted by section K); see also Henke, supra note 30 (describing the section K exemption). 
 87 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1346 (noting that it would not extend Kohlheim to section K law en-
forcement employees because that would “defeat the apparent regulatory intent to subject 7(k) [em-
ployees] to a different standard for compensated meals”). Indeed, in their respective appellate briefs, 
both parties in Avery recognized Kohlheim’s application of the relieved from all duties test and 
discussed whether the same test should be applied to section K exempt employees. See Appellee’s 
Brief at 26–27, Avery, 24 F.3d 1337 (No. 93-6353), 1993 WL 13015859, at *26–27 (acknowledg-
ing Kohlheim’s application of the “completely relieved from duty” standard); Appellants’ Brief at 8 
n.1, Avery, 24 F.3d 1337 (No. 93-6353), 1993 WL 13015858, at *8 n.1 (acknowledging Kohl-
heim’s adoption of § 785.19’s language).  
 88 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1346 (holding that the case at issue pertained specifically to employ-
ees exempt under section K and was distinguishable from the facts in Kohlheim). The court’s 
decision in Avery makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit applies a different standard to employees 
exempted by section K. See id. Moreover, this application comports with Congress’s intent. See 
Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments, 52 
Fed. Reg. 1897, 2023 (Jan. 16, 1987) (“However, the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments 
to the FLSA indicates that the unique ‘tour of duty’ concept utilized with respect to police and 
firefighters under section 7(k) should be treated differently from the normal ‘hours worked’ con-
cept under section 7(a), as set forth in Part 785.”). But see Henke, supra note 30, at 864–68 (com-
piling cases where courts have applied § 785.19 to section K exempt employees). 
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narrow scope of Avery’s holding was expressly noted in the opinion.89 Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit and numerous district courts within the Eleventh 
Circuit have acknowledged that Avery’s adoption of the predominant benefit 
test was limited to employees exempted under section K.90 Because an inter-
pretation of § 785.19 was not at issue in Avery, the Third Circuit’s citation to 
its holding in Babcock II is misplaced.91 Kohlheim’s application of the re-
lieved from all duties test therefore remains controlling law in the Eleventh 
Circuit for employees not otherwise exempt under section K.92 
CONCLUSION 
In reaching its holding in Babcock v. Butler County, the Third Circuit 
mischaracterized the status of the law on whether the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals uniformly apply the predominant benefit test when determining the 
compensability of an employee’s meal period under the FLSA. Although 
indeed an outlier among the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
application of the relieved from all duties test in Kohlheim v. Glynn County 
nevertheless remains controlling authority in the circuit’s jurisdiction. Giv-
en the far reaching implications that a circuit’s adoption and application of 
                                                                                                                 
 89 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1345–46 (“[W]e have never before addressed whether we should 
apply the predominant benefit test to . . . [section K] law enforcement employees . . . . If we were 
to extend [Kohlheim] to law enforcement officers, we would defeat the apparent regulatory intent 
to subject [section K] law enforcement officers to a different standard.”). 
 90 See, e.g., Roy v. Cty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 545 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that sev-
eral cases, including Avery, involved employees exempted under section K, and thus the court did 
“not rely on th[ose] cases” in deciding to adopt the predominant benefit test); Perez v. La Bella 
Vida ALF, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2487-T-33TGW, 2015 WL 6157102, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 
2015) (noting that Kohlheim held that, under § 785.19, an employee must be relieved of all of their 
duties or the meal period will be compensated); Chao, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 n.4 (concluding 
that the Avery holding requires the application of the predominant benefit test for claims brought 
by plaintiffs subject to the section K exemption whereas the “completely relieved from duty 
standard applies to § 785.19 claims in this circuit”); Arrington v. City of Macon, 986 F. Supp. 
1474, 1482 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (acknowledging that Avery’s application of the predominant benefit 
test was limited to section K law enforcement employees). In Roy v. County of Lexington, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1998 adopted the predominant benefit test but expressly 
stated that in coming to that decision, it did not look to the Eleventh Circuit’s Avery opinion for 
support because Avery’s application of the predominant benefit test was restricted to employees 
subject to the section K exemption. Roy, 141 F.3d at 545 n.6. 
 91 See Avery, 24 F.3d at 1346 (noting that Kohlheim turned solely on the interpretation of 
§ 785.19 whereas the case before the court dealt with section K exempt law enforcement employ-
ees); see also McGowan, supra note 35 (concluding that the Eleventh Circuit applied the “relieved 
from duty” standard). 
 92 See Chao, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 n.4 (“[T]he completely relieved from duty standard 
applies to § 785.19 claims in this circuit, regardless of how other circuits have interpreted the 
regulation. Therefore, any argument posited by either party to this action that the Eleventh Circuit 
applies the predominant benefit test to meal period claims under 785.19 is inapposite.”). 
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either test has on the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees 
alike, it is vital that the status of the law remain clear. 
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